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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KATIE JO MEYER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48356-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR-FE-2016-349

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Katie Jo Meyer failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked Meyer’s probation?
ARGUMENT
Meyer Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
On February 10, 2016, Meyer pled guilty to possession of heroin in

1

violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). (Aug. R., pp. 25-26, 30. 1) In the sentencing proceedings,
the court considered Meyer’s mental health and substance abuse issues. (4/13/2016 Tr., p. 15, Ls.
2-4; p. 18, Ls. 9-22; p. 23, Ls. 1-24.) On or about April 14, 2016, the court imposed a seven-year
sentence, with one and a half years determinate, then suspended the sentence for a seven-year
period of probation. (Aug. R., pp. 42-47.)
A few months later, Meyer was living with her parents and two younger siblings. (Aug.
R., p. 73.) Her father contacted Meyer’s probation officer to report that she had stopped taking
her medication and had threatened to kill her mother in her sleep and beat her sister with a baseball
bat. (Aug. R., p. 72.) On September 20, 2016, the state filed a motion for probation violation on
the basis that Meyer had failed to stay on her prescribed mental health medications and failed to
check herself into Intermountain Hospital as instructed by her probation officer. (Aug. R., pp. 7071, 75.) The court ordered a mental health evaluation. (Aug. R., pp. 78-79.) Thereafter, the court
committed Meyer to the custody of the Department of Health and Welfare for mental health
treatment. (Aug. R., pp. 81-83.)
After Meyer’s term of treatment ended in early 2017, the district court held a probation
violation hearing and revoked and reinstated probation. (Aug. R., pp. 98-101.) In its March 31,
2017, order, 2 the district court stated a condition of probation was “to take all medications
recommended and prescribed to [Meyer] by her treating healthcare practitioners and at the rate and
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This Court granted augmentation of the record to include the clerk’s record and transcript from
Meyer’s earlier appeal, No. 44982-2017. (R., p. 178.) The state refers to the clerk’s record from
Meyer’s appeal No. 44982-2017 as “Aug. R.” and the clerk’s record from the instant appeal No.
48356-2020 as “R.”
2
Meyer appealed this order, but the appeal was dismissed as moot. State v. Meyer, No. 44982,
2018 WL 4061581, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App., Aug. 27, 2018).
2

in the dosages as prescribed to her for any mental health or other medical condition[.]” (Aug. R.,
p. 98.)
Within a few months, Meyer again violated the terms of her probation. On July 10, 2017,
the state filed a motion for probation violation on the basis that Meyer had committed battery on a
police/peace officer or sheriff, possessed drug paraphernalia, failed to report to substance abuse
treatment on 26 different occasions, reported for treatment while under the influence on two
occasions, failed to complete inpatient substance abuse treatment at the Walker Center, failed to
maintain full-time employment, used methamphetamine on two occasions, used heroin on one
occasion, used marijuana on two occasions, used “acid” on one occasion, and failed to submit to
urinalysis testing on 14 different occasions. (R., pp. 28-30.) The district court revoked and
reinstated probation. (R., pp. 50-53.)
About three months after the court’s order, on January 2, 2018, the state filed a motion for
probation violation. (R., pp. 58-60.) The motion alleged failure to maintain full-time employment,
failure to report to probation officer, use of heroin on five different occasions, use of
methamphetamine on eight occasions, use of morphine on three occasions, use of dilaudid on two
occasions, failure to complete substance abuse treatment, failure to submit to urinalysis testing on
eleven different occasions, failure to pay fines, fees, funds, surcharges and/or costs, failure to pay
restitution, and failure to reimburse Ada County for public defender services. (R., pp. 74-77. 3)
The court revoked probation, imposed sentence, and retained jurisdiction while Meyer completed
a one-year rider. (R., pp. 97-100.) During the rider program, Meyer completed the programs
“Cognitive Behavioral Interventions for Substance Abuse” and “Thinking for a Change.” (Conf.
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The allegations cited are from the amended motion, filed February 2, 2018.
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Docs., pp. 44-45.) She also received a mental health evaluation and mental health treatment. (R.,
pp. 106-07; Conf. Docs., pp. 33-40.)
Upon completion of the one-year rider, at the end of March 2019, Meyer was reinstated to
probation once more. (R., pp. 124-30.) The court conditioned probation on Meyer enrolling and
meaningfully participating in mental health counseling and scheduling a mental health
appointment within three days of her release from custody. (R., p. 126.) The court also
recommended “that the Defendant pursue[] receiving injectable medications to insure that she
stays on her medication.” (R., p. 127 (bolding omitted).)
Within less than a year, Meyer again had problems complying with the terms of her
probation. (See, e.g., Conf. Docs., pp. 61, 75.) On February 11, 2020, the state filed a motion for
bench warrant and probation violation. (R., pp. 134-36.) Meyer admitted to willfully violating
the terms of her probation by using methamphetamine and by failing to pay fines, fees, funds,
surcharges, and/or costs as ordered by the court. (6/3/2020 Tr., p., 9, L. 25 – p. 11, L. 3.) The
court continued the probation revocation hearing and referred Meyer to mental health court. (See
9/23/2020 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 11-18; R., pp. 166-67.) According to her counsel, Meyer did not meet
the requirements for mental health court because at the screening Meyer had stated that “she is not
on medication and wouldn’t take medication[.]” (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 19-24.) After hearing
argument from counsel, the court revoked probation. (R., pp. 169-72.)
Meyer timely appealed. (See R., pp. 169, 174.)
B.

Standard Of Review
“Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis. First, it is

determined whether the terms of probation have been violated. If they have, it is then determined
whether the violation justifies revocation of the probation.” State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710,
4

390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017) (citations omitted). As to the first step, a “court’s finding that a violation
has been proved will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the finding.” State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations
omitted). “As to the second step, the decision whether to revoke a defendant’s probation for a
violation is within the discretion of the district court.” Id. (citations omitted). 4
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Meyer Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
“In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation

is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.” State v.
Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 733, 249 P.3d 1184, 1188 (Ct. App. 2011). Courts act within their
discretion to revoke a defendant’s probation when the defendant’s violations demonstrate that
probation is not serving its rehabilitative purpose or when the defendant poses a threat to society.
See, e.g., State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 798-99, 302 P.3d 1066, 1071-72 (Ct. App. 2013)
(not serving the goal of rehabilitation); Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d at 1188 (not achieving
rehabilitation and defendant was a risk to society).
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Meyer admits that she violated the terms of her probation. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) Accordingly,
this Court need only consider the second step of the probation revocation review.
5

For instance, in Fife, the Court of Appeals affirmed probation revocation, over the
defendant’s argument that the district court should have revised the terms of his probation, rather
than revoking probation, due to the defendant’s mental health issues. State v. Fife, 115 Idaho 879,
881, 771 P.2d 543, 545 (Ct. App. 1989). The district court had found that the defendant’s mental
issues contributed to him no longer responding to probation counseling. 5 Id. Because probation
was not serving to rehabilitate him and the defendant posed a threat to society, the district court
appropriately revoked probation. Id. Further, the district court had retained jurisdiction so that
the defendant could obtain psychiatric evaluation and treatment. Id. at 880, 771 P.2d at 544; see
also Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d at 1188 (affirming probation revocation when one of the
violations consisted of failing to obtain a prescription as required by the court).
Indeed, untreated mental health conditions may be a factor in a court’s decision, but they
are not, in and of themselves, controlling. See State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 666, 99 P.3d 616,
619 (2004) (holding that district court had appropriately considered the information in the
psychological report, which indicated that defendant who had committed forgery suffered from
untreated, severe depression, but that defendant posed high risk to reoffend, so imposing
concurrent sentence was within the court’s discretion).
Here the district court’s decision to revoke probation was reasonable. As this was Meyer’s
fourth probation violation, the court found that she was “not amenable for . . . having [her]
probation reinstated.” (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 21, L. 24 – p. 22, L. 5.) The court reasoned that probation
was not serving a rehabilitative purpose. (See 9/23/2020 Tr., p. 21, L. 25 – p. 22, L. 5.) Rather,
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While the opinion does not identify what Fife’s mental health issues were, the Ninth Circuit
opinion it cites regarding Fife’s Social Security disability appeal discusses Fife’s diagnoses, which
included “paranoid personality disorder” and “high depression.” Fife, 115 Idaho at 881, 771 P.2d
at 545 (citing Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)); Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d at 1429
(discussing diagnoses).
6

Meyer continued to exhibit the “same behavior of not remaining medication compliant.
Continuing to use. And absconding or making [her]self unavailable for supervision.” (Id.)
Meyer’s probation plan included medication compliance (Aug. R., p. 98; R., p. 126), but Meyer
had refused to accept that she had mental health issues and refused the medication. (Conf. Docs.,
p. 77; 9/23/2020 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 19-24; Aug. R., pp. 72-73, 75.) This history apparently led to the
district court noting, “So my hope is that you will make [the] mature decision to accept your
medical condition, just like other people accept their medical conditions, and decide to manage
your mental health issues so that you can be a full and active participant in all that life has to offer
you.” (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 10-15.)
Like the defendant in Fife, Meyer’s mental health issues contributed to her probation noncompliance, and the district court properly revoked probation because Meyer’s conduct
demonstrated that probation was not serving its rehabilitative purpose. See 115 Idaho at 881, 771
P.2d at 545. The district court had considered the mental health information before it (6/3/2020
Tr., p. 12, Ls. 2-18) as well as the number of Meyer’s violations and concluded that probation was
not helping Meyer succeed (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 21, L. 24 – p. 22, L. 22.)
Not only was probation not serving its rehabilitative purpose, but the record demonstrates
that Meyer posed a danger to society. She had attacked a police officer, bitten her mother, tried to
break into her parents’ house, assaulted another inmate while in jail, threatened to kill her mother,
and threatened to beat her little sister with a baseball bat. (R., pp. 28-30, 77; Conf. R., p. 101;
Aug. R., p. 72.) The court acted within its discretion when it revoked probation. See Fife, 115
Idaho at 881, 771 P.2d at 545; Calley, 140 Idaho at 666, 99 P.3d at 619.
Meyer argues that the district court did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason
because it failed to appropriately consider Meyer’s severe mental health problems.

7

(See

Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.) Meyer is mistaken. The fact that Meyer has mental health issues does
not alter the fact that the district court’s decision fell well within the controlling standard.
Probation was not serving its rehabilitative purpose for Meyer, and the record reflected Meyer was
a danger to society.
The district court by no means ignored or misapprehended Meyer’s mental health issues,
as Meyer contends. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) In fact, the district court had referred Meyer to
mental health court (R., pp. 166-67), had ordered a mental health evaluation (R., pp. 106-07), and
had set mental health-specific conditions for Meyer’s probation (Aug. R., p. 98; R., pp. 126-27.)
While Meyer contends that the district court’s use of the words “mature decision” indicate the
court wrongly concluded Meyer’s problem was immaturity (see Appellant’s brief, p. 6), as
explained above, the court was rightly referring to Meyer’s history of denial of her mental health
diagnoses, not focusing on some alleged immaturity. Further, Meyer can hardly complain of such
language when her own counsel had identified immaturity as a reason for leniency at the
sentencing hearing. (See 4/13/2016 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 23-24 (defense counsel arguing “I think maturity
is also an issue as well”).)
And while Meyer appears to argue on appeal that she is incapable of taking her medications
(see Appellant’s brief, p. 6), she introduced no such evidence at the probation revocation hearing
(or any evidence at all). (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 3-6.) And the articles she cites (see Appellant’s
brief, p. 6) should not be considered because they are new evidence not introduced in the court
below. See State v. Snapp, 163 Idaho 460, 463, 414 P.3d 1199, 1202 (Ct. App. 2018) (Appellate
review “is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.”) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Skogen, No. 38701, 2012 WL 9495962, at *2
(Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2012) (explaining that appellant’s argument relied heavily on criminal
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justice articles, which “in effect are new evidence that would be improper to consider for the first
time on appeal”).
The district court appropriately exercised its discretion to revoke Meyer’s probation.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 27th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Jennifer Jensen
JENNIFER JENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

JJ/dd

/s/ Jennifer Jensen
JENNIFER JENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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